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ABSTRACT
Pension  plan descriptions from respondents to the 1992 Health and Retirement Study are
compared  with descriptions obtained from their employers. Earnings histories reported by respondents are
compared with earnings histories from the Social Security Administration.  The probability of linking
employer  pension data, which is two thirds for current jobs, and of obtaining permission to link an earnings
history, which is over 70 percent, are not well explained by respondent characteristics. 
Half  of respondents with linked pension data correctly identify plan type, and fewer than half
identify,  within one year, dates of eligibility for early and normal retirement benefits.  Benefit reduction rates
are  essentially not reported. Respondents do better in reporting pension values, but the unexplained
variation  is still considerable.  In contrast, respondent reported values, together with other observables,
account  for 80 percent of the variation in pension values and 75 percent of the variation in covered earnings
measured from linked records. Thus prospects are good for  imputing plan values, but not for imputing the
location  or size of early retirement incentives.  Our findings raise questions about how well respondents
understand complex pension and Social Security rules.
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I. Introduction
It is now widely recognized that analyses of retirement and saving behavior must take
account of pensions and Social Security.  For those approaching retirement age, on average their
pensions and Social Security are as valuable as the total of all their other assets combined
(Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier, 1999).  Moreover, both pensions and Social
Security significantly affect the rewards for continued work.
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It is not surprising then that surveys are including more questions about pensions and
Social Security.  Some surveys, especially those of people approaching retirement age, not only
ask respondents about their pensions, but also collect pension plan descriptions from the
respondents’ employers.
2  To improve the quality of information on these key data, the Health and
Retirement Study links the respondent survey to Social Security earnings histories for the three
fourths of respondents who gave permission allowing the Social Security Administration to
provide the records.
In this paper we discuss similarities and differences in the information obtained from
respondent surveys and from linked data.  First, we compare and contrast pension plan
characteristics and values when they are computed from respondent versus employer reports. 
Second, we compare and contrast Social Security benefits estimated from the respondent’s self
reported work history with benefits estimated from the respondent’s actual covered earnings2
history.  
Using the comparison of respondent, firm-provided and administrative information, we
determine how well respondents understand their pensions and how accurately they report their
covered work history.  Further, we devise methods to predict pension and Social Security benefits
for respondents when appropriate data are not available.  More specifically, we address the
following key questions:
• How do the covered, employed respondents for whom there is a matched employer-
provided pension plan description, and the respondents for whom there is a matched
Social Security record, differ from those with missing pension or Social Security records? 
• What do comparisons between benefit amounts self reported by respondents with and
without matched records suggest about the biases from confining samples only to those
for whom matched records are available?  For pensions?  For Social Security?
• Earlier studies suggest that respondents frequently misreport pension plan type (Mitchell,
1988; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989).  What problems are created by such
misidentification when linked data are missing and the researcher must rely exclusively on
respondent reports?  
• Among those for whom we have both respondent-reported and linked employer pension
data, how do the plan features reported by respondents compare with those computed
from employer provided pension plan descriptions? How do plan values compare?  Are
studies that rely exclusively on respondent reports of these key plan features or plan values
subject to serious bias?  
• What are the effects on the sample if analysts only include in their studies observations3For example, in their reduced form retirement study based on the HRS, Gruber and Coile
(1999) eliminate observations when linked pension or Social Security data are not available.
4Bernheim (1988) found, using a different data set, that modal predictions of Social
Security benefits from self reported data were unbiased.  The findings clearly suggested, however,
that there were important differences throughout the distributions.  
5There is an additional problem because many respondent reports are incomplete, leaving
out details of pensions and earnings history.
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for which matching employer provided and Social Security data are available, and omit
observations for which plan descriptions are only available from respondents?
3  
• How do Social Security benefits differ when estimated from respondent reports of
earnings histories from estimates based on administrative records of covered earnings?
4  
• What do the comparisons between benefit amounts computed from respondent-reported
and matched data suggest is the best way to impute pension and Social Security benefits
for those respondents without a linked pension or Social Security record?  
• Do respondents do better in describing their plans when they are closer to retirement
than when they are further away?
Once these questions have been answered, we turn to another aim of this paper, to
facilitate research with the linked employer provided pension plan descriptions and the Social
Security records.  Some researchers may feel they must either use only those observations that
have linked data available, or estimate relations for the full sample using only respondent
reports.
5  If only observations with linked data are used, the sample may not be representative. 
But if respondent data are used, errors and imprecisions may be introduced, especially in
analyzing retirement and saving behavior.  We report equations that relate pension and Social
Security values estimated using linked employer provided pension or Social Security records, to6A procedure has been established at HRS, in coordination with the National Institute on
Aging and the Social Security Administration, to protect respondent confidentiality when linked
data are made available.  A researcher must apply for access to restricted data.  The application
requires a research plan, a data protection plan, a demonstration of grant support from a federal
agency, and a promise not to link the restricted data to any but specified respondent files.  The
basic respondent survey without linked data is available on an unrestricted basis.  The pension and
social security data file produced from this work will provide information derived from the linked
data, but will be made available on an unrestricted basis.
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the values obtained from respondent reports and other independent variables.  If we take the
outcome produced using linked data as a more accurate measure, these equations allow
researchers to project pension outcomes for those observations for which linked data are not
available.  In addition, we will produce files for distribution to HRS users that contain the
predicted values of these variables for all observations, including the observations for which linked
data are available.  This will make information from the linked data available to a wider group of
researchers, including those who do not apply for or obtain permissions to use the linked data
directly.
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There also is a broader set of questions about behavior. To the extent that people do not
understand their pensions and Social Security, there may be consequences for measurement of
wealth and retirement incentives, and also for how behavioral models should be specified.  If older
workers have a poor understanding of pensions and Social Security incentives, then those who are
misinformed may not respond to measured incentives in the way that models of saving and
retirement behavior would predict. That is, if respondent reports differ from employer-provided
plan descriptions, it is not clear whether the researcher should use linked data in estimating
behavioral models on the assumption that all actors are well informed.  In subsequent research we
will determine the extent to which any misinformation influences behavior. That, in turn, requires5
that we determine which features of these plans cause the most confusion, carefully detailing the
extent of misunderstandings. We intend to determine which features cause the most confusion in
this paper.
II. The Data
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a longitudinal, nationally representative study
of older Americans.  The survey began with an initial cohort of 12,652 individuals from 7,607
households, with at least one household member born from 1931 to 1941. The first wave was
fielded in 1992.
In wave 1, 71.6 percent of respondents gave permission to link Social Security earnings
histories to their interview record.  Records were actually linked for 95 percent of those who gave
permissions.  The share of respondents with linked Social Security records was raised to 74.9
percent as a result of additional permissions obtained in waves 2 and 3.  
Social Security values may be estimated from respondent reports of their earnings and
work history.  Specifically, respondents were asked about the starting date on their current job,
starting and ending dates for their last jobs, (i.e., the job last held by those not working in 1992),
and starting and ending dates for the previous 5 year job held before the current or last job.
Respondents were also asked about earnings at these dates.  In addition, the survey asked
respondents in Wave 3 about the date of entry into the labor force, how many years were worked
before the date the previous job was secured, and how many years of work were in jobs covered7Wage profiles are forced through all observations, and values for missing years are
projected off the profiles on the basis of experience and education.  The wage profile coefficients
are taken from Anderson, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) and are based on data from the Survey
of Consumer Finances.  Coefficients are: experience .0138221, experience squared -.0002827,
and experience * education .000996.
8These counts are for individual jobs, not individual pensions. That is, if an individual had
both a DB and a DC pension in a job, it would be counted once in these tallies.  However, an
individual may have more than one entry if he or she had pensions in both the current job and a
previous job, or in the last job and a previous job.
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by Social Security.  From this information, we construct a covered earnings history
7 and we use it
as the basis for calculating the respondent’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), and the
Social Security benefit the respondent is entitled to (Primary Insurance Amount, or PIA).  
If a respondent was covered by a pension, the HRS also requested from the employer a
detailed description of the pension plan.  Employer-provided pension plan descriptions proved to
be more readily available for a respondent’s current job than for jobs held in the past.  The match
rate was 65% for  the 4456 jobs that respondents held at the time of the survey, where they
reported they were offered pensions.  The match rate was  66% for the 1387 cases for the last job
held by respondents with no current job in 1992, who reported a pension on their last job.  For the
previous job of 5 years duration held before the current or last job, the match rate was 35% of
2839 pensions.  In addition, the survey identified another 750 jobs with pensions.  Since the
survey did not ask for the employer name and address for those jobs, none of the jobs had
matched pensions.
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Averaging over all these jobs yields an exact match percentage for employer-provided plan
descriptions of 51%.  This combines a figure of almost two-thirds from current and last job
pensions, with a much lower figure for pensions on previous jobs.9The pension plans were coded from the Summary Plan Descriptions provided by
employers at the University of Michigan, and software written for that purpose was used to
evaluate the coded plan descriptions.  The software generates pension values by applying the
coded rules from the pension plan to respondent reports of earnings and tenure. The user specifies
assumptions as to interest rate, wage growth, and which respondent reports of retirement dates
are to be used.  Details about the procedures employed are available in Gustman, Mitchell,
Samwick and Steinmeier (forthcoming).
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  Respondents were also asked a series of detailed questions about their pensions.  First
the respondent was asked about pension coverage, and if covered, about plan type.  If the
respondent indicated his plan is of the defined benefit variety, the question sequence asked about
the dates of early and normal retirement, the year of expected retirement, and the associated
yearly benefits.  If the respondent indicated his plan is of the defined contribution type, the
questions focused on the amounts currently in the account and on rates of contribution.
In the case of those with defined benefit plans, the Summary Plan Description (SPD)
provided by the respondent’s employer contains a full and accurate representation of the pension.
To be sure, there are some possible sources of error.  Most importantly, some plan descriptions
will have been dated, referring to provisions in place some time before 1992, but no longer
relevant in 1992.  Also, despite extensive checking, some plan features may have been miscoded. 
Moreover, if a firm has experienced complex merger activity, multiple plans may cover different
individuals with similar apparent backgrounds, creating the possibility of a mismatch.
9   
In the case of defined contribution plans, the respondent report as to the balance in the
account may be more accurate for estimating plan value.  Because the HRS must preserve
respondent privacy, when collecting pension plan descriptions, the name of the covered individual
was not identified to the firm.  Therefore, the amount accumulated in the pension account held by
a particular respondent must be estimated from the firm’s contribution rate as reported in the plan10 Appendix Table 1, column 1, reports the Social Security permission rates in wave 1 for
respondents according to individual and job characteristics.  
11 Haider and Solon (1999) and Olson (forthcoming) reach similar conclusions.
12 Despite the relatively poor fit in the Social Security permission equations, we will include
these covariates in later regressions to adjust predictions for whatever selection is systematically
associated with these observables.
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description, and the respondent’s self reported work history and contribution rate.  In addition,
although the HRS collects the plan description at a moment in time, both the contribution rates
and the returns may have changed over time.  Nevertheless, the respondent’s answer may be
subject to reporting error, perhaps to substantial error in some cases. 
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Matching Rates for Pension and Social Security Records.  
Table 1 reports the results of a probit, where the dependent variable is a qualitative
indicator equal to 1 if permission was given by the respondent in wave 1 allowing HRS to match
the Social Security record.  Because the Social Security Administration was able to match 95
percent of the records of those who gave permission, to understand what determines the match
rate, one needs to understand what determines the permission rate.  The independent variables are
various characteristics of the respondent and the respondent’s job.
10   The partial effects of the
probit are reported together with the z statistics.  The independent variables account for only a
small part of the variation in the Social Security permission rate.
11   Among the individual variables
that are significant, black and Hispanic respondents, respondents with higher assets and highest
education, respondents who expect never to retire, or who do not report a specific retirement
date, were less likely to grant permission.
1213 Appendix Table 1, column 3, reports the pension matching rates in wave 1 for
respondents according to individual and job characteristics.  
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Table 2 reports probits where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether there is an
employer-provided pension plan description for the respondent.
13  The first column indicates the
correlates of pension matches for all respondents who indicated they were covered by a pension
on some job.  Separate equations are shown for pension matches on the current job held in 1992,
the last job for those with no current job, and the last five year job held previous to the last or
current job.  For the purpose of examining retirement incentives, it is the pension on the job just
preceding retirement that is most important; though the survey has a lower pension match for
previous jobs, this is less crucial for retirement modeling.  
The likelihood of finding an employer plan description is not closely related to the
independent variables included in Table 2.  However, the fit is somewhat better than it was for a
Social Security permission rate in Table 1. Across all pension plans, blacks, those with more
schooling, homeowners, those with the shortest planning horizons, those with the longest tenure,
and those with jobs in nonmanufacturing, are more likely to have a pension match.  Those with
the highest assets and earnings, those from firms employing fewer than 100, those in management
jobs, and those who report they are covered by DC plans, are less likely to have a matched plan
description.  
In addition, the more valuable the plan, the higher the probability of a match.  This last
finding suggests that if one confined the sample only to those with matched pension plan
descriptions, the value of the pension will be overstated.  Similarly, because the probability of a
Social Security earnings record match is lower the higher an individual’s earnings, if a researcher10
confines the sample to those with a Social Security match, he is omitting from the sample a
disproportionate share of those who will receive the highest Social Security benefits.
B. Pension Comparisons
Table 3 contains four tables describing the joint distribution of plan types reported by
respondents and their firms on jobs held by respondents in 1992.  These data are only for
respondents with a matched employer-provided pension plan description.  
Table 3A contains the frequencies of plan type reported by covered respondents and by
their employers.  If the firm reports two plans, one a DB and one a DC, the firm is classified as
offering both, and there is one entry in the “Both” row.  In Table 3A, we find 1881 cases where
both the individual and the firm reported having a DB pension, with or without a DC pension:
(777+380+409+315).  For DC plans the comparable number is 916, where both the respondent
and employer reported that the individual is covered by a DC plan (327+111+163+315). 
The share of the total of 2907 observations falling in each cell is reported in Table 3B. 
The observations along the diagonal in Table 3B represent only about half the joint distribution of
firm and individual reported plan types, suggesting that respondents do a poor job of reporting the
type of pension plan they are covered by.  Some of the misreporting may be due to 
nonparticipation; even when the firm reports it offers both plan types, some 14 percent of
respondents report they are covered only by a DB plan.  This difference may reflect a failure of
the respondent to report coverage by a DC plan when they don’t participate in the DC plan.  Even
allowing for this misreporting, the discrepancy in plan types is substantial, amounting to over one
third of the plans.  Because the sequence of questions asked about the pension is conditioned on
the plan type reported by the respondent, this is a crucial problem for surveys that wish to14 Means from the separate distributions suggest more agreement between respondent and
firm reports of plan type than is found in the micro data.  At the micro level respondents and firms
agree on plan type in 49 percent of the respondent-employer matches. In contrast, compare the
fractions with only DB, only DC, or both types of plans computed separately from the reports of
individuals and firms.  From the bottom row in Table 3B, we see that 46 percent of respondents
report that they are covered by DB plans only, 24 percent report they are covered by DC plans
only, and 28 percent report they are covered by both types of plans.  Similarly, from the last
column of Table 3B, 48 percent of firm provider reports indicate that the plan is DB only, 21
percent indicate that the plans are DC only, and 31 percent indicate that the firm offers both types
of plans. Thus when the descriptive statistics from firm and individual reports are compared, they
suggest a much higher level of agreement than is found at the level of the individual observation.
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determine pension values solely from respondent reports.
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Table 3C reports the distribution of respondent reports of plan type, conditional on the
plan type reported by the firm.  As seen in the first column of Table 3C, among respondents
whose employers report they are covered by a defined benefit plan, only 56 percent report that
their plan is DB.  An additional 27 percent of those whose employers report their plan is DB
report that their plan is both DB and DC.  Thus among those whose employers indicate they are
covered by a DB plan only, 83 percent of the respondents report coverage by a DB plan.  Fifteen
percent of those whose employers report they are covered by a DB plan report they are covered
by a DC plan only.  From the second row of Table 3C, among those whose employers indicate
they are only covered by a DC plan, slightly more than half, 54 percent, get the plan type right. 
Altogether, among the observations where the employer reports a DC plan only, the respondent
reports a DC plan, either held exclusively or (mistakenly) together with a DB plan, in 72 percent
of the cases.  Twenty six percent of those whose employer reports their plan is DC, representing
14 percent of the sample with a matched pension plan, report their plan is DB only.  For those
whose employers report they are covered by both a DB and a DC plan, slightly more than a third,
35 percent, report coverage by both a DB and a DC plan.  Among the remainder, 45 percent12
report they are covered by a DB plan only, and 18 percent report they are covered by a DC plan
only.
By way of comparison, we report the percentages from Gustman and Steinmeier (1989,
Table 6), which provided results analogous to Table 3C using the 1983 Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF).  In the SCF, 63 percent of respondents whose firms reported a DB plan only also
reported coverage by a DB plan only, compared to 56 percent from the HRS in Table 3C.  In the
SCF, of respondents whose employers reported a DC plan only, 37 percent reported they had a
DC plan only.  This compares to 54 percent in Table 3C.  Although the HRS respondents do a bit
worse in identifying DB plans only, they do much better in identifying DC plans only than
respondents in the SCF sample did, perhaps due to the increasing popularity of DC plans over the
decade.
Suppose for those without a matched pension we wish to determine plan type.  The
simplest idea would be to use the respondent report.  But the respondent report will not be
reliable for two reasons.  First, there is a problem of selection bias; that is, the sample without a
matched pension is different from the sample with a matched pension.  Second, the respondent’s
report will be wrong for roughly half the cases.  Consider the distribution of firm reports
conditional on respondent reports as shown in Table 3D.  For those respondents who report they
have a DB plan only, 58 percent of the firms indicate they offer only a DB plan. Counting those
whose firms report DB and DC coverage, DB plan descriptions will be available for 88 percent of
those respondents reporting DB coverage, but DC plans will be missed for the additional 42
percent of those whose firms report they have only DC plans or both types of plans.  Among
respondents who report they have only a DC plan, 47 percent will have an exact match provided13
by an employer who reports offering a DC plan only.  But we will have DB plan descriptions from
employers for 53 percent of respondents who report coverage by a DC plan only. Among
respondents reporting coverage by both types of plans, descriptions of both plans are available
from only 39 percent of their employers, suggesting about 60 percent of respondents are
misinformed.
Ages of Eligibility for Early and Normal Retirement Derived From Self Reports and Firm
Reports
Ages of early retirement are reported in Table 4 for respondents in jobs held in 1992,
where both the respondent and the firm report the plan is defined benefit.  The median age of
early retirement reported by the respondent is 57.  When applying the formula reported by the
firm to respondents’ self-reported work histories, the median age of early retirement across plans
is 55.  The average early retirement age is 57.6 when reported by the respondent, and 55.4 when
calculated from the firm-provided plan description.  That is, when based on the firm-provided 
plan description, the early retirement date is about two years earlier than the early retirement date
reported by the respondent.  According to the firm provided data, two thirds of respondents will
be able to retire early by the time they reach age 55; but less than half of respondents think they
will be able to retire early by age 55.  Thus respondents to the HRS appear to be more pessimistic
about their eligibility for early retirement than is warranted by the provisions of their plans.  We
will see below that some respondents may simply be ignorant of the opportunity to retire early, or
perhaps otherwise consider it to be irrelevant.  SCF respondents ten years earlier did not overstate
the age of early retirement.  In the data from the 1983 SCF, we found that the median early dates
expected by respondents and the median early retirement dates computed from plan provisions14
and earnings histories were both age 55.  Moreover, the SCF included workers from age 40 on,
so that those sampled in the SCF were further from retiring than the HRS sample.  Yet the median
expectations of early retirement date in the SCF sample were more accurate than in the HRS
sample.  One possible reason is that early retirement was somewhat less common in the SCF than
in the HRS, and the age of early retirement was not as far below the age of normal retirement as it
is in 1992.  Thus even if a number of respondents were ignorant of the opportunity to obtain early
retirement benefits in the SCF, it made less difference. 
Another piece of evidence suggests that people are less optimistic today about when they
can retire than they were in the past.  In previous work using SCF data, we found that in the self-
reported data, mean early retirement dates were lower than the median dates by about 3 years. 
Because the medians were equal between the self reported and firm reported data, this suggested
that there were a few people who were highly optimistic about when they would be eligible for
their early retirement benefits.  In the HRS, evidence of this optimism has disappeared: mean and
median dates of expected eligibility for early retirement benefits are the same.  This result
corresponds with the findings from the direct comparisons of early retirement dates based on the
respondent and firm-provided data.  People are more pessimistic about the ages of eligibility for
early retirement benefits in the HRS than they were in the past.  
It is also useful to examine the distribution of differences between the early retirement
dates expected by respondents and the dates they will attain early retirement eligibility according
to their firm reports.  Of the observations with firm-reported retirement ages in the range from
age 50 to 65, only 28 percent (435/1569) lie along the diagonal in Table 4, indicating that the
respondent and firm based early retirement dates are identical.  Moreover, only 43 percent of15
respondents (671/1569) report an early retirement date within one year of the firm-based early
retirement date.  The simple correlation between the provider reported and self reported
retirement dates is 0.353.
This wide variation in dates of eligibility for early retirement benefits is a particularly
important problem for analysts wishing to model retirement.  For many pension plans, benefit
rules give covered workers a substantial benefit increment from working up to the point of early
retirement age.  By working the year a respondent becomes eligible for early retirement, the HRS
respondent typically increases the present value of the pension by an amount equal to a year of
pay, or more (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999a).  This provides a powerful incentive for
respondents to remain at the firm.  If, in formal models of retirement behavior, individuals appear
to leave their firms before reaching that date, retirement models will indicate that individuals are
not sensitive to economic incentives when making their retirement decisions.  As seen in the
responses  tabulated in Table 4, many individuals will report an early retirement date that is later
than the date they actually will become eligible for early retirement benefits. As they approach
retirement age, in many cases the firm will make clear to them that they are being too pessimistic. 
But that new information may not be reflected in the individual responses to the survey, and the
analyst will not have the correct answer unless the firm provided plan description is available. 
Unless an adjustment is made when using respondent reported data for those who seem to leave
just before becoming eligible for early retirement benefits, this form of reporting error will cause
the effects of pension incentives on retirement to be understated, and the parameter estimates will
also lead to an understatement of the influence of Social Security on retirement.
How accurately are pension rules described by those respondents closest to retirement? 16
Table 5 compares the respondent-reported early retirement dates with the dates calculated from
the firm plan descriptions and respondent reported records, this time confining the sample to the
371 respondents in the 1992 wave 1 HRS survey who indicated that they wanted to retire by
1995.  For this sample, and using the pension formula reported by the firm to the respondent’s self
reported work history, the median age of early retirement eligibility is estimated to be 55, the
same as the median age of early retirement eligibility expected by respondents.  For the full
sample, we found the median early retirement date expected by respondents to be two years later
-- at age 57.  Thus for those expecting to retire within three years of HRS wave 1, the firm-
reported and respondent-reported median dates of early retirement correspond. However, a
systematic bias persists.  When the sample is confined to those who are approaching retirement, in
the mean early retirement date based on respondent data is later than the mean date based on firm
data:  the average respondent reported early retirement age is 57.0; while the mean age of
eligibility for early retirement calculated from firm reported data is 54.8. Moreover, the mean
exceeds the median early retirement age in self reported data, suggesting that some of the
respondents are overly pessimistic, but it is not those in the middle of the distribution.  Thus
individuals within three years of their expected retirement date also expect to have a later early
retirement date than they in fact are eligible for, but unlike the full sample, the difference is due to
overly pessimistic projections by some in the tail or tails. 
When in Table 5 we confine the sample to those who intend to retire by 1995, we continue
to observe the same wide discrepancy between the early retirement dates computed from provider
formulas and from respondent data that characterized the full sample in Table 4.  Thus for the full
sample, 28 percent of the observations were found to project their early retirement dates17
accurately, so that observations lie along the diagonal in Table 4.  Similarly, for those who expect
to retire by 1995, 27 of the observations lie along the diagonal in Table 5.  In addition, in Table 5,
we find that 39 percent of the observations for this group are within one year of the early
retirement date calculated with the firm provided plan provisions, the same proportion found for
all respondents.  The correlation coefficient is 0.359 for the data in Table 5, virtually identical to
the correlation coefficient of 0.353 found for Table 4.
Table 6 examines the joint distribution of  normal retirement dates predicted from provider
plan descriptions and from respondent data.  The median normal retirement age is 62 in both the
respondent provided data and the firm-provided plan descriptions.  The means are 61.3 and 60.7
when normal retirement ages are computed from firm reported plan provisions and respondent
expectations respectively.  However, the discrepancies are much wider in the individual data than
they appear from the medians or means.  Among those with normal retirement dates between 50
and 65, as computed from employer-provided plan descriptions, 33 percent of the observations lie
along the diagonal in Table 6.  Among this same group, 40 percent have an expected normal
retirement age within one year of the date calculated from employer-provided data.  The
correlation between the normal retirement dates from provider and self reports is 0.352.  This
suggests that while there is no systematic bias in the expectations about the age of qualifying for
normal retirement, the dispersion is no lower for age of normal retirement than it is for the age of
qualification for early retirement benefits. 
A key characteristic of the defined benefit pension is the benefit reduction rate.  It is the
rate at which benefits are reduced for each year the covered worker retires before the normal
retirement date.  If the reduction rate is relatively low, early retirement is subsidized so that the15 The self-reported voluntary contribution variable is a dummy variable for whether the
plan has a 401(k) component.  As such it would be incorrect to infer that a plan with voluntary
contributions does not also have required contributions.
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benefit accrual peaks at early retirement age.  
The benefit reduction rate  is available from both the individual and the firm for relatively
few of the 1881 jobs where both the respondent and the firm report  coverage by a defined benefit
plan.  As can be seen in  Table 7,  we can compute early retirement reductions for only about 58
percent of firm observations; most of the remainder are cases where the worker joined the firm
recently enough that he or she is not eligible for early retirement prior to the normal retirement
age .  The median benefit reduction rate reported by firms is 4 to 5 percent. Respondents
themselves have almost no idea how much the benefit reduction rate is.  Out of 1881 respondents
with a defined benefit pension in their 1992 job, 1512, or 80 percent, either do not think they are
eligible for early retirement or do not know what the benefit reduction rate is for their plans.
Indeed, it appears that half of the respondents do not think they can retire before the normal
retirement age.  Of the remaining 369 respondents, the median reported benefit reduction rate is 5
to 6 percent, well above the average observed from provider data.  Altogether, there are only 234
observations on benefit reduction rates that are jointly reported by the respondent and by the firm. 
Of these, only 26 lie along the diagonal.  For this limited number of observations, the correlation
coefficient is 0.524.
As Table 8 shows, there is agreement in a majority of cases about whether a DC plan
allows voluntary contributions.
15   In 392 out of 873 observations, providers and respondents
agree there are voluntary contributions.  In another 121 cases, both respondents and the firm
agree that there are no voluntary contributions.  Thus, 59 percent of the cases lie along the main19
diagonal. With respondents and firms disagreeing about voluntary contributions in 41 percent of
the cases, the most likely misreport occurs where the firm reports there are voluntary
contributions and the respondent reports there are none.  These misreports account for 35 percent
of the observations.
Plan Values Derived From Self Reports and Firm Reports
Table 9 examines results for pensions from the current job at the time of the survey.  The
results for the first two columns are for individuals who said they had defined benefit plans whose
value could be computed from the respondents’ answers and whose firms indicated that the
individual was indeed covered by a defined benefit plan.  Combination plans with a defined benefit
component are also included in these numbers.  The last two columns pertain to individuals who
said that they had defined contribution plans and whose firms indicated likewise.  Individuals who
reported they had both defined benefit and defined contribution parts to their pension, and whose
firms agree that the pension had both components, may be in both columns.  Individuals who say
they had only defined benefit plans but whose firms indicate only defined contribution plans, or
vice versa, are not included in this table, although they are included in later tables.  Thus, this
table and the next several tables pertain to individuals for whom the respondent and the firm agree
on the type of pension, and for whom the principal ingredients of the pension (earnings, expected
benefits, accumulations, etc.) are available and not imputed.
Table 9 shows the dollar amounts associated with various points on the univariate
distributions of defined benefit and defined contribution pension amounts, calculated both using16 In Table 3 there were 1923 plans where both the respondent and the firm reported plan
type as defined benefit.  Table 9 reports pension values for 1122 defined benefit plans.  The
difference is accounted for by missing data, primarily because only two thirds of respondents in
Table 3 reported expected pension amounts (or percentage of pay).  For similar reasons, Table 9
reports results for 641 observations, whereas there were 916 observations in Table 3 where both
the respondent and the firm reported there was a defined contribution plan.
17   By assuming that benefits stay constant in nominal terms, we ignore the fact that some
pensions have benefits that are reduced when the participant becomes eligible for Social Security. 
About 12 percent of participants in defined benefit plans indicated that their pensions would be
subject to such provisions.
18 The projected future earnings are calculated using Social Security Administration
projections, increasing the 1992 earnings by 6.3% per year.
19 Some difference might arise because the respondent might assume future wage growth
different than the 5% growth (the Social Security Administration’s intermediate projection) we
assumed when evaluating the firm pensions.  Therefore, we adjusted the respondent’s projected
benefits to allow for implied differences in wage growth assumptions.  To be more specific, the
survey asked about the expected benefits on the date the individual expects to start them and the
wages both in 1992 and at the normal retirement age.  To project the wage to the benefit start
20
the respondents’ answers and the formulas in the pension documents obtained from the firms.
16  
For defined benefit plans, the survey asked when the respondent expected to start collecting the
pension, and how much the pension would be.  The pension value in column 1 of the table is the
present value (discounted to 1992) of the expected benefits from the date of expected retirement
forward, assuming that the pension remained the same in nominal terms.
17   If the respondent failed
to answer either the expected age when the pension would start or the amount of the pension, the
pension value is not imputed.  The second estimate of the pension value, which is in column 2 of
the table, comes from applying the respondent’s earnings and tenure at the expected collection
date to the rules found in the pension documents.
18   These rules give the value of the annual
benefit, year by year.  The value of the pension is again the discounted value of this stream of
benefits.
19   If the respondent’s 1992 earnings were imputed, the value of the pension is notdate, we interpolate the wage between 1992 and the normal retirement age.  We then calculate the
implied ratio of the benefit to the wage that the respondent is expecting at the benefit start date. 
Finally, we multiply this ratio by the wage the respondent would have if the 1992 wage grows by
5% per year.  This essentially adjusts the reported benefit for differences in wage growth
assumptions. However, there are some observations for which this procedure does not work very
well.  These observations have the common feature that the individual is almost at the normal
retirement age but expects to work several more years.  For instance, the individual may be 59,
have a normal retirement age at 60, expect to retire at 65, and report earnings of $40,000 at 59
and $80,000 next year.  Continuing this rate of growth until 65 yields a value which is clearly
nonsense.  Therefore, we compared the computed wage at expected retirement to the wage which
would be obtained by simply growing the 1992 wage by the growth rate assumed in the Social
Security projections.  In the relatively few cases where the former exceeded the latter by more
than 50%, we took the expected pension benefits at the expected retirement age at face value and
did not try to make any adjustments.  
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imputed, since the imputed earnings may not be a very accurate indication of actual earnings for
individual respondents.
For defined contribution pensions, the value of the pension as determined by the
respondent, which is in column 3 of the table, is simply the answer to the question regarding the
current value of the accumulation.  To arrive at the amount calculated from the plan documents,
the required contribution amounts are calculated for each year that the participant has been
employed in the firm.  If this is expressed as a percent of the annual earnings, the percent is
multiplied by the earnings in the year.  These contributions are accumulated forward using a 6.3
percent nominal interest rate from the long run projections of the Social Security Administration,
and the sum of these contributions is the implied present value.  If the plan allows for voluntary
contributions, the percentage of contributions in the survey year is extrapolated backward, and the
individual is assumed to have contributed the same percentage of previous years’ earnings.  The
plans themselves indicate if the contributions began after the respondent began to work for the
firm.  If an individual’s 1992 earnings are imputed, or if the respondent did not respond to the20 In our earlier analysis of data for the Survey of Consumer Finances, we found that
pensions based on respondent reports were more valuable than pensions based on the plan
formula (1989, Table 5).  The findings here are just the opposite.  We also found that unlike our
earlier findings, people on average are now more pessimistic about their ages of eligibility that is
warranted by the plan.  Perhaps the finding that people are less optimistic about their pensions
than they were ten years ago reflects a shift of attitudes in response to changing firm policies over
the past decade?
22
question about contributions and the plan had voluntary contributions, the present value is not
imputed.  The resulting calculated defined contribution pension values are in column 4 of the
table.
Table 9 indicates that for the defined benefit plans, the mean present value of benefits
based on the employer reports, $168,405, exceeds the mean value based on the respondent report,
$148,015. At the median, there is remarkable agreement between the defined benefit amounts
based on the respondents’ responses and those based on calculations from the pension documents. 
In fact, looking at the values in the 25
th  and 75
th  percentiles, the middle part of the distribution is
almost identical.  Only in the two tails are the pension amounts calculated from the firm
documents noticeably higher than the amounts calculated from the respondents’ expected
pensions.
20   For defined contribution plans, however, the situation is considerably different.  The
mean pension value based on firm reports of $85,790, greatly exceeds the mean value based on
the respondent report, $59,105.  While the upper tail for the distribution of DB plans exhibits
provider values that exceed the values reported by respondents, the same is true for the top 90
percent of DC recipients; that is, for DC pensions the  entire distribution of accumulations that the
respondents report is much lower than the amounts calculated from the plan documents.  In the
middle and upper parts of the distribution, the respondents’ accumulations are less than half as
much as the amounts from the plan documents at the corresponding percentiles.21 The correlation coefficient, which is heavily influence by the larger values, is 0.615.
22 The correlation coefficient for the observations in Table 11 is 0.302.
23
Although the distributions are similar for the defined benefit pension amounts calculated
from the respondents’ expectations and the pension documents, Table 10 indicates that there are
substantial differences between the two amounts at an individual level.  To some degree, this
result could have been expected after looking at Tables 4, 5 and 6.  If respondents are that
inaccurate in reporting the early and normal retirement ages of their plans, it seems unlikely that
they would be more accurate in reporting their expected pensions, which presumably involve
more complex calculations than do the early and normal retirement ages.  The fact that the joint
distribution is more or less symmetrically distributed around the main diagonal reflects the fact
that the two individual distributions are similar, and indeed the fact that the largest entries are
down the main diagonal is encouraging.  However, only about 40 percent of the observations fall
along the main diagonal.  Moreover, the ranges of the categories in this table are very wide, and
even being one entry off the main diagonal is consistent with the respondents’ estimate of pension
value being half or twice the corresponding amount calculated from the pension documents.
21  
Table 11 shows the joint distribution for the defined contribution plans.  The scatter of the
plans is about the same as for the defined benefit plans, with 28 percent of the observations falling
on the main diagonal.
22   This is probably one of the main messages of both Table 10 and Table 11:
at the individual level, there is a great deal of difference between the pension amounts based on
the respondents’ answers and those based on the plan documents.  A second message is specific
to defined contribution plans, namely, that the accumulations reported by respondents are
systematically lower than the amounts calculated by using the pension documents to figure the23 The pension calculation program assumes a constant contribution rate for participants of
plans with voluntary contributions.
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contributions and cumulating these contributions over time.  In this table this comes out in the fact
that the majority of the entries are below the main diagonal.  In Table 9 the difference in the mean
value of the defined contributions plans amounted to almost fifty percent of the value reported by
the respondents.
The systematic difference between the accumulations reported by the participants and the
values calculated from the pension documents could have several potential explanations.  Most
obviously, the participants could be systematically under-reporting the plan accumulations. 
Alternatively, the rate of return used by the pension program in calculating the pension reports
may be higher than the actual return experienced by the participants.  Finally, for the plans with
voluntary contributions, the participants may have contributed substantially less in prior years to
the plan than their current contribution rates would suggest.
23   Note that the first of these
explanations implies that the respondents’ answers are systematically incorrect, while the last two
imply that the amounts calculated by the pension program are incorrect.
To distinguish among these competing explanations, Table 12 presents the results for
those DC plan participants whose plans do not allow for voluntary contributions.  In Table 12, the
number of entries above the main diagonal is approximately the same as the number below the
diagonal.  Although the number of observations is much lower than in Table 11, Table 12
suggests that among those participating in plans without voluntary contributions, there is no
systematic tendency for the pension values calculated from the plan documents to be more or less
than the accumulations reported by the respondents. 24   For reasons of confidentiality, the HRS did not tell the firm the name of the respondent
when it collected the pension documents from the firm.  It was thus unable to ask anything about
the actual contribution rates for particular individuals and was forced to obtain this information
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The fact that values appear close for plans without voluntary contributions, but not for
those with voluntary contributions suggests that the third explanation mentioned above is correct. 
The other two explanations should have equal force whether the firm permits voluntary
contributions or not.  As for the accuracy of the reports, one would expect that participants in
plans with voluntary contributions should be more accurate in their reports.  For these
participants, there is a periodic decision as to how much to contribute, and to the extent that this
decision impels them to look at their pensions, they should have better information.  As for the
return assumptions built into the pension calculations, the fact that the calculated plan values and
the reported accumulations agree for participants in plans with no voluntary contributions
suggests that the return assumptions are approximately correct, at least for those participants.
Those assumptions are for a very modest 2.3% real return.  It is logically possible that the returns
to those pensions with voluntary contributions are lower, but to produce the results in Table 11
the returns would have to be substantially negative for pensions with voluntary contributions.
This leaves us with varying contribution rates for plans with voluntary contributions as the
primary suspect.  In defined contribution plans without voluntary contributions, the plan itself
specifies how much the firm and the participant contribute.  This information is included in the
pension plan calculations.  The plan may also specify how these contributions have varied over
time, and this information is also included in the calculations.  For voluntary contributions, the
plan may specify minimum and/or maximum contributions, but the actual contributions must come
from the participant.
24   Further, if the contribution rate has increased over time for a participant,from the respondents.
25 The correlation coefficient for the data in Table 12 is 0.478.
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as might be expected as the participant moves closer to retirement, this information is not
captured in the survey.  Thus the calculations based on voluntary contributions for participants
nearing retirement may considerably overestimate the values of the accumulations in the plans.
25  
Note again that if this explanation is correct, it is likely that the accumulation reported by the
respondent may be better than a plan value calculated from the pension document for these plans.
This point is expanded in Table 13 and in Figure 1.  This table groups defined contribution
pensions according to the value calculated by the pension program on the basis of the pension
documents.  The top part of the table deals with defined contribution pensions without a provision
for voluntary contributions.  The first row indicates the median accumulation reported by
respondents, and the second row indicates the median value calculated by the pension program. 
The solid line in Figure 1 calculates the ratio between the two.  The ratio is about 1.5 for small
pensions (below $5,000 in present value), and about 1.0 for pensions between $5,000 and
$50,000.  Above $50,000, where the number of pensions is low, the ratio fluctuates more widely,
but there is no evidence of a systematic bias.  All in all, the solid line confirms our more casual
finding from Table 11, that the reported accumulations and values calculated from the program do
not differ systematically for pensions without voluntary contributions.
The lower part of Table 13, which is reflected in the dotted line in Figure 1, indicates the
results for pensions with voluntary contributions.  For these pensions, for values above the first
category, there is evidence of a systematic difference between accumulations reported by
respondents and those estimated by the pension program using the pension documents.  There is27
some indication that the degree of underestimation is worse for larger pensions.  As discussed
before, the likely explanation for this is that the respondents have contributed less in previous
years than they are currently contributing.  This implies that for defined contribution plans with
voluntary contributions, the calculated values from the pension documents probably overestimate
the true value of the accumulations.  This brings us to the question: what is the best estimate of
the true value of the pensions?  The inaccuracies in respondent reports are obvious.  However, it
is also likely that the values calculated from the pension documents are not completely accurate. 
Part of the reason is that the these calculations still employ uncertain information from the
respondents, such as earnings, years of service, and the like.  Another reason is that the program
is forced to make assumptions about information not collected from respondents, such as the time
path of earnings and the time path of voluntary contributions.  Is the best estimate of the true
value of the pension the value calculated from the pension documents or the value calculated from
the information that the respondents give?  Or is it better to somehow combine the information in
the two sets of numbers?
For defined benefit plans, the best estimate is almost certainly the one calculated from the
pension documents.  It is subject to errors in earnings and years of service, but it captures the
details of the pension plan that most respondents may be unaware of unless they have already
retired and asked the firm as to how the benefits were calculated.  In cases where there are sharp
differences, it seems much more likely that the respondent is making an uninformed guess than
that the provider calculations are substantially wrong.  The fact that the two distributions are
similar does not give any cause to think that one or the other of the estimates is systematically
biased.28
Many of the same arguments hold for defined contribution plans with contributions that
are completely specified by the plan.  In addition to uncertainties regarding earnings and years of
service, there is an additional uncertainty here having to do with investment returns.  This
uncertainty would be an argument in favor of the respondent reports of the accumulations. 
However, where there are large discrepancies between the accumulations as reported by the
respondent and the firm provided plan description, again, there do not appear to be systematic
differences between the two sets of values which would indicate that one or the other was biased.
For defined contribution plans with voluntary contributions, the situation is  even  murkier. 
It appears in this case that the amounts calculated from the plan documents are systematically
higher than the accumulations reported by respondents.  It further appears that the probable cause
of this is that the respondents have increased their contribution rates over time, inducing the
calculations from the plan documents to be too high.  This would be an argument for giving more
credence to the accumulations reported by respondents.  However, there is still a tremendous
amount of scatter in Table 11, which means that for a substantial number of respondents, there is
an order of magnitude of difference between the amounts calculated from the pension document
and the amounts that the respondents report.  Although increasing contribution rates could
contribute to some of the scatter, it seems unlikely that this could be the explanation for a scatter
of this magnitude.  Moreover, the scatter appears to be approximately as wide as the scatter in
Table 10, for which the arguments that the scatter is due to respondent inaccuracies are more
persuasive.  This leads to the conclusion that while the amounts calculated from the pension
documents are too high, much of the scatter in Table 11 is due to respondent misreporting.
Given this conclusion, it would appear that the amounts calculated from the pension26   Regressions with additional variables were tried, but in these regressions only a small
number of variables were significant, and they suffered from the problem that they yielded
negative predicted values for some of the pensions.
29
documents, while too high, are probably better guides to the accumulations than are the
respondent reports.  In this situation, the best approach may be to take the values calculated from
the pension documents and apply a correction to reduce the apparent bias.  Table 14 presents the
results of a median regression attempting to quantify this overestimation for the sample of plans
with voluntary contributions.  The dependent variable is the ratio of the accumulations reported
by respondents to the value calculated from the plan documents, which is the amount plotted on
the vertical axis in Figure 1.  The independent variable is the log of the pension value calculated
from the plan documents, and its square.  This value is the variable plotted on the horizontal axis
of Figure 1.  The estimated function has a value of approximately unity at a pension value of 
$1,000 and drops to 0.48 for a pension value of $25,000 and 0.36 for a pension value of
$100,000.  To correct for the apparent bias in the values calculated from the pension documents,
we will adjust those values by reducing them according to the results implied by the regression in
Table 14.
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Projecting Pensions from Linked Data for Those Without a Linked Employer Record
The last task is to predict the value of the pension, adjusted by the procedure described in
the last paragraph, based only on the information in the respondent’s survey.  This will allow us to
predict the values of pensions for respondents for whom the survey was not able to obtain pension
documents.  At first glance, it would seem that we could take the respondents’ defined benefit and
defined contribution pensions and project them separately, and then combine the results. 
However, the problem is complicated by the fact that a substantial number of respondents are30
misinformed about the type of plan they have, as shown in Table 3.  For example, for a
respondent who reported only a defined benefit plan, we could regress the values calculated from
the plan documents on the values calculated from the respondents’ expected benefit amounts, but
this would miss the fact that of respondents who report only a defined benefit plan, almost half in
fact either have an additional defined contribution plan or have only a defined contribution plan.
There are two ways to deal with this problem.  One is to use multinomial logits or probits
to predict the probability of a respondent actually having a defined benefit, defined contribution,
or both types of plans conditional on his answer to the question about plan type on the survey. 
Then, conditional on each of these plan types, we could predict the value of the defined benefit
and defined contribution (as appropriate) conditional on the pension values calculated from
information that the individual reports.  This would require, for instance, calculating the
probability that an individual who reports a defined benefit plan in fact has a defined contribution
plan, and then inferring the value of the defined contribution plan from the reported defined
benefit plan plus additional variables.  In the end, we would take the expected value of the
imputed values of the various types of plans weighted by the probability that the individual has
them, conditional on the respondents’ reported plan types and pension values.
A simpler way, and the one that will be pursued here, is to combine all the pensions that
the individuals have and to try to impute the combined value from the information available from
the respondents.  To do so, however, we must be careful about combining the pension amounts. 
The value of the defined benefit plan is the value that the respondent expects to collect and
includes the effects of future years of work.  On the other hand, the value of the defined
contribution plan is the amount that is accumulated in the respondent’ account, which presumably31
only includes the effects of work to the date of the survey.  To combine the two amounts for a
single individual, we should either extend the defined contribution amount out to the respondent’s
retirement date or only consider the part of the defined benefit value that is due to work to date.
The choice is largely dictated by the purpose of the exercise.  To compute a pension
amount that reflects current wealth as of the survey date, adjusting the defined benefit amount
would be appropriate.  To compute a final pension wealth amount at retirement, adjusting the
defined contribution amount forward to the expected retirement age would be more advisable. 
Here, we construct a pension amount to be used in conjunction with other components of wealth
as of the survey date, so we adjust the defined benefit amounts to correspond to the amount as of
the survey date.  Unfortunately, there is no unique way to do this, since two approaches are
available.  One approach figures the value of the pension using current tenure and current
earnings, and assumes that the individual separates from the firm immediately.  A second
approach figures the discounted value of the pension assuming that the participant works until the
expected retirement age, and prorates the pension based on the proportion of eventual years of
service already accumulated.  In the literature, the former approach is known as the “legal” value
of the pension, while the latter is known as the “projected” value of the pension.  The argument is
akin to the familiar problem of allocating the price of an asset over time: there are a variety of
methods of figuring depreciation.  In the current context, there is probably an argument for using
the projected measure of pension value, since the legal measure effectively ignores the option
value that the participant has acquired by working at the firm to date.
To calculate the respondent’s total pension value, we rely on two amounts, one based on
the pension documents, and one based only on the respondents’ responses.  The procedures are27 Note that the value of DC plans with voluntary contributions is adjusted according to the
coefficients in Table 14.
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similar to each other except for defined contribution pensions with voluntary contributions.  The
accumulations directly reported by the respondents are taken as is, but the amounts calculated
from the pension documents are reduced according to the procedure discussed above to allow for
increasing contributions over time.  To the accumulations for DC plans with voluntary
contributions, modified as described, we add the value of defined contribution pensions without
voluntary contributions.  This gives two figures for total defined contribution pensions: one based
on plan documents, and one on accumulations reported by respondents.  For defined benefit plans,
we multiply the amount calculated from the expected benefit amounts by the fraction of years
until retirement that have already been served.  Then the total defined benefit amount is added to
the total defined contribution amount, separately for the amounts calculated from plan documents
and for the amounts based on the respondents’ answers.  Thus, it would be possible for the total
pension value, calculated from the plan documents, to be the sum of a defined benefit pension and
a defined contribution pension with voluntary contributions, if those pensions are indicated in the
plan documents.  At the same time, the total pension value based on the respondent’s answers
would simply be a defined contribution pension with no voluntary contributions, if the respondent
listed only that type of pension when asked about pensions.
Table 15 tabulates the resulting total pension values as calculated from plan documents vs.
the total values calculated only from respondents’ information.
27   Note that unlike the previous
tables, this one includes cases where the respondent told the survey that he or she had one type of
pension but the plan documents indicated another type.  The table looks reasonably symmetric28 Note that the provider plan values for DC plans with voluntary contributions in Table 16
are adjusted according to the coefficients in Table 14.  The regressions include variables for
missing values for plan characteristics, with the value for the missing variable indicator set to 1 if
the characteristic is relevant to the type of plan and the plan characteristic is missing, and the
value of the missing variable set to zero, so that the value is picked up in the coefficient of the
variable indicating the value is missing.
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around the main diagonal, as would be expected since we have eliminated systematic
discrepancies between calculated values and reported accumulations for the defined contribution
plans.  However, there is a wide scatter, indicating that there remains a large difference between
the amounts calculated from the plan documents and those reported by the respondents.
Table 16 reports on regressions to explain the values calculated from the plan descriptions,
which are taken to be approximately correct.
28   In total there are six regressions.  The first four
regressions use observations in which pension value estimates are available from both the provider
and the respondent.  The first and third of these regressions use only the value of the plan
calculated from the survey questions as an explanatory variable.  The second and fourth add
additional explanatory variables.  The second and fourth regressions use the preferred
specification, and these results give some idea as to how much adding in the additional
explanatory variables improves the fit of the regression.  The fifth and sixth regressions explain
the value of pensions obtained from provider plan descriptions, but pertain to observations where
pension amounts are not available in the respondent survey.  Since the final two regressions use
only the observations for which the pension value cannot be calculated from the survey questions,
it perforce does not include that value.  From Table 10 we saw that respondents who did not
report amounts for their pensions had, on average, lower values calculated from the plan
documents than did respondents who did report a value.  Hence, it would not be advisable to take34
a mechanical approach, applying a regression for those who did report pension values to impute
pensions for those who did not report pension values without any further adjustment.
Equations 1 and 3 and equations 2 and 4 are related regressions.  Because the distributions
of pension values appear to be roughly loglinear, if regressions were run on the linear values
computed from the plan documents vs. the linear values calculated from the survey questions, the
regressions would give enormous weight to very high value pensions.  To avoid this, we take the
log of the pension values.  However, this creates another problem, since some of the pensions,
especially those calculated from the plan documents, have zero values.  For the explanatory
variable (the value calculated from the survey questions), we can take care of this by creating a
binary variable which takes on a value of one if the pension value is zero.  For the dependent
variable, it requires estimating the pension value in two steps.  The first step is a probit for the
probability that the pension value calculated from the plan documents will be zero.  As might be
expected, this probability declines rapidly as the pension value calculated from the survey
questions increases.  The second step is a regression of the log of the value from the plan
documents on a set of explanatory variables, conditional on the value being positive.  The probits
are in equations 1, 2 and 5; the regressions are in the third, fourth and sixth equations.
For those who have positive employer-provided and respondent pensions, equation 3
suggests an elasticity of employer pension value with respect to reported respondent value of
around .73.  The R2 for that equation is 0.63, suggesting that self reported plan value is
associated with about two thirds of the variation in the plan value calculated from firm reports. 
Holding other plan features and job characteristics constant, equation 4 suggests an elasticity of
firm reported plan values with respect to respondent values of .24, but that holds constant a35
number of plan characteristics that are associated with higher plan value.  Thus equation 4 should
be used to predict pension values, but a great deal of care should be exercised in attempting to
interpret any particular coefficients.
Other Sources of Error:
We have not yet considered another source of error on the part of respondents.  Some
individuals may not correctly report whether they are covered by a pension on their job.  One
worrisome scenario occurs when a respondent reports the firm does not offer a pension, but the
firm does in fact offer a pension and the respondent is covered.  When informed by the respondent
that the firm does not offer a pension, the HRS does not attempt to collect a plan description. 
One way to search for such an error is to compare responses in wave 1 and wave 2 for
respondents who said they were in the same job.  If the respondent said he had a pension in wave
1, he was asked about changes in that pension in wave 2, wherein he could deny he had a pension. 
If the respondent said he did not have a pension in wave 1, he is asked in wave 2 whether he has a
pension.  As seen from Table 17, about 20% of those saying they did not have a pension in 1992
reversed their stance in 1994, but relatively few who said they did have a pension in 1992 denied
it in 1994.  Whether the asymmetry is due to the differences in the questions asked in 1994, or
whether the respondent reports a pension only if he decides to participate, and those reporting
coverage decided to participate in ‘94, is open to question.  Given that a denial is stronger than
simply responding afresh to the pension question, we would have expected this pattern to some
degree, but perhaps not to this extent. 
C. Social Security Comparisons
The Social Security earnings records provided by the HRS are unique to this group of29 Table 18 includes the social security records obtained based on permissions granted by
respondents in wave 1, as analyzed in Table 1, and in addition it includes social security records
obtained with permissions granted by respondents in waves 2 and 3. 
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surveys.  Only a few researchers who work at or with the Social Security Administration have
access to comparable data.  From these records, we can closely estimate for HRS respondents the
amount of covered earnings, computed as Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), and
values of their Social Security benefits, computed as the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). 
Although there is a small chance of a mismatch, the earnings records are a gold standard. 
Therefore patterns of discrepancies between respondent reports and the benefits computed from
the earnings histories are very informative.  Moreover, these relationships are useful in predicting
the values of Social Security benefits for the 25 percent of HRS respondents for whom we do not
have Social Security earnings records.
Table 18 summarizes the distributions of reported earnings based on Social Security
records and respondent reports of earnings histories for the 9472 respondents for whom HRS has
a matched earnings record.
29   The data in the table are AIME computed on an annual basis, i.e.,
AIME multiplied by 12.  Using respondent reports, including earnings on the current or last job in
1992, at the start of the current or last job, in a previous job, in past pension covered jobs, and
incorporating information from wave 3 on the age the respondent initially entered the labor force,
years of full time work, and years of covered work, we overestimate average indexed yearly
earnings by about 6.6 percent, overestimate average yearly earnings for men by about 3.5 percent,
and overestimate average indexed yearly earnings for women by about 23 percent.  When the30 It would also be of interest to estimate the relation of the benefit calculated from the
respondent’s earnings record and the benefit the respondent expects, as reported in question N46
of the HRS.  However, looking at the correlation between the respondent’s estimated social
security amount and the amount calculated from the records runs against several problems.  First,
less than half of the respondents ventured a guess as to the amount.  Looking at the counts for
question N46, 5815 respondents reported that they expected to receive social security benefits,
but only 2563 ventured an amount.  Secondly, since the question was in section N, the financial
respondent answered the question for both spouses, meaning that there is a non-random sample of
respondents answering the question for themselves.  Third, there is a temporal mismatch: the
amount constructed from the record pertains to earnings through 1991, but the amount self-
reported presumably includes the effects of any future work.  In addition, it is reported in dollars
of some future year, and we don’t have a  good fix on the price levels in that year.
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differences are ordered from low to high, however, the median difference is greatly reduced.
30
Table 19 displays the joint distribution of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings on a
yearly basis.  The dispersion is narrower than the dispersion of pension values.  In Table 19, there
are a total of 9472 observations; of those, 7303, or 77 percent, fall within one cell of the diagonal,
and 4066 observations, or 43 percent of the observations fall exactly on the diagonal.  The R
2 is
0.82.
The univariate distributions of the primary insurance amounts on an annual basis, as
computed from respondent earnings reports and from SSA earnings records are reported in Table
20.  The means as computed from respondent earnings reports are 5.8 percent higher than the
means computed from Social Security earnings records. For men, the values computed from
respondent reports are 1.4 percent above the amounts computed from Social Security earnings
records, and for women, using the values computed from respondent reports of earnings causes
benefits to be overstated by 13.5 percent.  It is likely that the cap on covered earnings plays some
role in generating the discrepancy, but the cap cannot account for the fact that benefits for women
are overstated by so much more than the overstatement found for men.38
In Table 21, which involves more cells than in Table 19, 6033 observations, or 64 percent
of the observations, fall within one cell of the diagonal.  The observations along the diagonal
account for 31 percent of all observations (2942/9472).
Tables 22 and 23 report the relations between the present values of own benefits as
computed from respondent earnings reports and those obtained from the Social Security
Administration.  Overall, the present value of own benefits is seen in Table 22 to be 5.9 percent
too high when computed from respondent reported earnings.  For men the lifetime benefits are
about 0.8 percent too high when computed from respondent earnings histories, and for women
they are 13.6 percent too high.  From Table 23, we find that 68 percent of the observations are
within one cell of the main diagonal (6428/9472), and that the observations along the main
diagonal account for 34 percent of the observations (3251/9472).
Table 24 reports coefficients for equations that relate the AIME on an annual basis,
computed from the Social Security earnings record, to variables that are observable in the survey. 
These equations include observables associated with the availability of an earnings record, and
may be used to predict the annualized AIME for those observations without a Social Security
record on the basis of the observable characteristics for those respondents.  When separate
equations are estimated for men and women, the regression accounts for 60 percent of the
variance in annualized AIME for men, and 66 percent of the variance for women.  Since this
equation is meant for prediction, rather than for analytical purposes, it includes a number of
different measures of earnings and benefits.  Consequently, the coefficients on particular variables
are not readily interpretable.39
IV. Conclusions
We began the study by asking whether it is possible to do a reasonable job in explaining
who has a linked Social Security or pension record and who does not.  There is some systematic
relationship.  Those with the least valuable pensions are less likely to have a pension match. 
Those with higher incomes are less likely to have a pension or Social Security match.  This creates
a problem for researchers who would base their analysis of pension or Social Security wealth only
on a sample that includes respondents with linked data.  Nevertheless, observables do not do a
very good job in explaining who gave permission to obtain a Social Security record.  Pension
matches are more predictable, but the explanatory power is still not very high.  Thus in neither
case is there is a very strong role for observables, suggesting that the penalty from restricting the
sample may not be very high. However, we have not generated evidence on selectivity with
respect to unobservables.
We have also investigated how pension plan features and values differ under two
circumstances: when the information is obtained directly from respondents, and when the
information is obtained from the employer.  In addition, we compared covered earnings histories
developed from respondent reports, and the implied Social Security benefits, with covered
earnings histories obtained from the Social Security Administration, and the implied benefits. 
For those who have matched records, we also ask whether it is possible to explain the
variation in pension values and earnings histories based on employer-provided pension records or
Social Security administrative data, using information from respondent reports, including
respondent perceptions of pension values or earnings histories, to provide the explanations. 
Relatively good explanations are obtained. For most purposes, these results suggest that it will be40
possible to predict pension and Social Security values for those without a matched record based
on the relationship between respondent reported outcomes and administrative or firm-provided
data for those with a record available.  The equations we estimate can be used to predict pension
and Social Security values for those in the HRS without an attached pension or Social Security
record.  The accompanying files we produce for HRS users can be used not just to impute
pension and social security wealth levels for those without a matched record, but can also be used
by researchers who require information on pension or social security wealth levels, but do not
wish to or cannot obtain permission from the HRS to use restricted data.
Nevertheless, observed discrepancies between the firm provided and administrative
records on the one hand, and respondent reports on the other are large for many respondents,
large enough to suggest that a great deal of caution is required in any behavioral research that
uses pension or Social Security measures as explanatory variables.  In addition, in the case of the
dates of early and normal retirement and the benefit reduction rates associated with defined
benefit plans, the discrepancies between self reported values and values obtained from linked data
are too wide to permit imputation. Thus researchers will have to be especially cognizant of the
effects of reporting error on parameter estimates, especially when attempting to predict the effects
of nonlinear benefit formulas on the retirement decisions made by those who do not have a
pension plan description available. 
The implications of this situation depend on the nature of the analysis.  For the estimation
of retirement models, particularly models whose purpose is to estimate the effect of economic
incentives on retirement, researchers may be justified in omitting observations if the Social
Security record, or more importantly the pension record, is not available.  Given the magnitudes41
of the errors in reporting early and normal retirement ages in defined benefit plans and benefit
reduction rates, it seems likely that the retirement incentives will be severely misrepresented if
only the respondent reports can be used.  Many respondents may retire at ages that correspond to
their true incentives, but if those incentives are inferred by the researcher to occur at other ages, it
will appear to the researcher that respondents are not responding to economic incentives.  The
situation is better in studies that seek to simulate behavior under different hypothetical scenarios. 
In simulations, it is not quite so crucial that pensions be matched exactly with the right individuals,
as long as the statistical matches are valid.
Our findings also suggest that the behavioral models may have to be modified.  It appears
that older respondents today are pessimistic about what their plans will be worth.  This pessimism
is recent, and different from the situation ten years ago, when there was an important subgroup of
respondents who was overly optimistic about its benefits, and when the respondents would be
permitted to retire.  The wide discrepancies we find at the individual level between the pension
reports of respondents and firms, and the Social Security amounts based on earnings reports from
respondents and computed from earnings records, further suggest that even those on the verge of
retirement have imperfect information about their pensions and Social Security.  Many
respondents approaching retirement may not be reacting to the correct information, but may be
making their decisions based on a faulty understanding of their retirement programs  Accordingly,
the discrepancies we find raise important questions about models of retirement and saving that
assume that households are fully informed about their financial condition, and that they fully
understand the incentives presented by complex pension and Social Security rules.42
Table 1: Probit For Probability Permission Was Given in Wave 1 to Match the Social Security Earnings Record
Independent Variable          Partial Effect          z
female  0.000 0.01
single -0.034 -2.94
no child -0.018 -0.99
child not known -0.173 -4.81
black -0.028 -2.26
Hispanic -0.061 -3.96
high school drop out 0.014 1.22
some college -0.021 -1.69
college graduate -0.028 -1.70
some graduate school -0.041 -2.50
home owner -0.008 -0.56
assets $0 to 10K 0.075 4.02
assets 10K to 25 K 0.072 3.64
assets 25 K to 100K 0.035 2.99
assets 250K to 1000K -0.038 -3.00
assets 1000+K -0.010 -0.44
assets not known -0.190 -4.12
retirement horizon <2 years -0.001 -0.08
retirement horizon 2 to 4 years0.006 0.33
retirement horizon 10+ years 0.001 0.09
retirement horizon never -0.040 -2.29
retirement horizon not applicable -0.042 -2.21
retirement horizon not asked from
proxy
-0.540 -23.64
retirement horizon not known -0.047 -2.70
firm size 0 to 4 employees 0.021 1.04
firm size 5 to 14 employees 0.008 0.38
firm size 15 to 24 employees 0.012 0.38
firm size 25 to 99 employees 0.039 1.88
firm size 500+ employees 0.029 2.01
firm size not known -0.013 -0.54
nonmanufacturing  -0.002 -0.17
industry not known  -0.035 -0.62
management  -0.010 -0.89
white collar  -0.015 -1.19
occupation not known -0.172 -1.84
union  0.020 1.49
union not known 0.054 2.38
annual earnings $0 to 15K -0.015 -0.74
annual earnings $15 to 30K -0.029 -1.51
annual earnings $30 to 50K -0.036 -1.90
annual earnings $100+K -0.035 -0.96
annual earnings not known -0.069 -2.02
pension  -0.009 -0.76
pension status not known 0.184 1.95
cons 8.26
Number of Observations, 12,652 Log Likelihood, -7158.599 Pseudo R2, 0.065243
Table 2: Probit for Probability There Is a Matched Pension Provider Survey
Independent Variable All Pensions Current Job Pension Last Job Pension Previous Job Pension
Partial Effects z Partial Effects z Partial Effects z Partial Effects z
female  0.010 0.747 0.010 0.54 0.073 2.077 -0.011 -0.485
single -0.023 -1.396 -0.018 -0.866 -0.044 -1.032 -0.036 -1.299
no child 0.014 0.542 0.004 0.107 0.015 0.237 0.051 1.287
child not known -0.032 -0.663 -0.100 -1.619 -0.071 -0.614 0.093 1.180
black 0.053 3.099 0.000 0.014 0.107 2.677 0.103 3.541
Hispanic -0.020 -0.775 -0.041 -1.261 -0.123 -1.887 0.053 1.146
high school drop out -0.076 -4.505 -0.034 -1.528 -0.114 -3.237 -0.102 -3.429
some college 0.033 2.061 0.007 0.328 0.070 1.667 0.046 1.748
college graduate 0.082 3.887 0.087 3.043 0.133 2.278 0.042 1.301
some graduate school 0.097 4.722 0.120 4.373 0.174 2.762 0.042 1.280
home owner 0.050 2.349 0.018 0.627 0.133 2.463 0.055 1.612
assets $0 to 10K 0.030 1.131 0.018 0.499 0.113 1.675 0.017 0.393
assets 10K to 25 K -0.009 -0.324 -0.021 -0.569 -0.022 -0.306 0.030 0.645
assets 25 K to 100K -0.001 -0.079 0.017 0.871 -0.031 -0.811 -0.004 -0.171
assets 250K to 1000K -0.005 -0.28 0.026 1.162 -0.049 -1.218 -0.010 -0.358
assets 1000+K -0.114 -3.178 -0.106 -2.08 -0.116 -1.335 -0.113 -2.069
assets not known -0.051 -0.65 0.060 0.603 0.157 0.663 -0.338 -1.943
retirement horizon <2 years 0.062 3.447 0.010 0.298 0.136 1.623 0.136 4.659
retirement horizon 2 to 4 years 0.036 1.683 0.043 1.77 0.075 0.521 0.024 0.601
retirement horizon 10+ years -0.019 -1.117 -0.013 -0.65 0.142 1.423 -0.026 -0.864
retirement horizon never -0.037 -1.383 -0.040 -1.203 0.049 0.366 -0.011 -0.270
retirement horizon not applicable 0.005 0.122 0.130 1.369 -0.009 -0.124
retirement horizon not asked from
proxy
-0.012 -0.386 -0.042 -1.14 0.129 1.186 0.042 0.821
retirement horizon not known -0.013 -0.492 0.005 0.147 -0.119 -0.953 0.010 0.239
tenure 0 to 1 0.013 0.367 -0.027 -0.685 0.029 0.345 -0.197 -1.202
tenure 2 to 4 0.024 0.989 -0.039 -1.36 0.083 1.271 0.089 1.498
tenure 10+ 0.058 3.806 0.016 0.736 0.058 1.227 0.077 3.402
tenure not known -0.138 -1.156 -0.333 -1.506 -0.124 -0.503 0.029 0.140
firm size 5 to 14 employees -0.409 -9.053 -0.391 -8.325 -0.421 -4.083 n.a.
firm size 15 to 24 employees -0.254 -4.736 -0.283 -4.863 -0.165 -1.509 n.a.
firm size 25 to 99 employees -0.238 -8.855 -0.248 -8.633 -0.193 -3.425 n.a.
firm size 500+ employees 0.014 0.876 0.012 0.675 0.025 0.752 n.a.Independent Variable All Pensions Current Job Pension Last Job Pension Previous Job Pension
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firm size not known -0.221 -3.984 -0.227 -3.735 -0.074 -0.547 n.a.
nonmanufacturing  0.091 5.571 0.088 3.98 0.055 1.405 0.069 2.594
industry not known  0.032 0.458 0.043 0.452 -0.090 -0.583 0.071 0.607
management  -0.110 -7.091 -0.047 -2.272 -0.141 -3.671 -0.141 -5.468
white collar  -0.013 -0.75 -0.031 -1.381 -0.075 -1.832 0.040 1.455
occupation not known -0.253 -2.076 -0.062 -0.329 -0.362 -2.093
union  0.006 0.379 0.044 2.482 -0.007 -0.216 n.a.
union not known -0.120 -2.134 -0.169 -0.949 0.235 0.845 n.a.
annual earnings $0 to 15K 0.022 0.772 0.062 1.631 -0.109 -1.467 0.051 1.012
annual earnings $15 to 30K -0.007 -0.282 0.025 0.786 -0.105 -1.52 0.007 0.131
annual earnings $30 to 50K -0.001 -0.027 0.028 0.946 -0.125 -1.869 0.051 0.993
annual earnings $100+K -0.307 -5.348 -0.285 -4.593 -0.347 -1.557 -0.281 -1.970
annual earnings not known -0.079 -1.042 -0.047 -0.447 0.224 1.008 -0.179 -1.354
dc plan -0.185 -5.96 -0.190 -4.807 -0.074 -0.91 -0.165 -2.570
combination plan -0.044 -1.669 -0.055 -1.884 0.131 1.615 -0.072 -1.160
Plan type not known -0.226 -5.159 -0.189 -3.147 -0.070 -0.572 0.016 0.069
DB plan: annual benefits 0 to 2K -0.089 -3.44 -0.073 -1.591 -0.151 -2.6 -0.037 -1.013
DB plan: annual benefits 2 to 5K -0.065 -2.345 -0.087 -2.084 -0.074 -1.348 -0.009 -0.200
DB plan: annual benefits 10 to 25K 0.104 4.346 0.026 0.778 0.080 1.648 0.209 5.293
DB plan: annual benefits 25+K 0.143 4.536 0.152 3.409 -0.027 -0.423 0.203 3.839
DB plan: annual benefits dk 0.005 0.19 -0.016 -0.5 -0.078 -1.067 -0.191 -0.851
DC plan: 0-10K in account 0.047 1.704 0.085 2.686 -0.093 -1.101 0.032 0.518
DC plan: 10-25K in account 0.070 2.288 0.073 2.178 0.141 1.386 -0.012 -0.163
DC plan: 100-250K in account 0.088 1.884 0.084 1.704 -0.033 -0.226 0.150 1.093
DC plan: 250+K in account 0.147 2.153 0.132 1.717 0.199 0.769 0.134 0.927
DC plan: dk amount  in account 0.055 1.964 0.064 2.034 -0.079 -0.977 0.056 0.860
constant 1.578 1.716 0.159 -4.399
No. Of Obs. 8682 4448 1384 2839
Pseudo R2 0.1574 0.1164 0.1355 0.1221
Log Likelihood -5031.335 -2539.922 -772.28188 -1606.174445
Table 3: Pension Plan Type as Reported by the Respondent and the Firm, for Current Job Held in
1992, Including Only Those Respondents with a Matched Pension Plan
3A: Self Reported vs. Firm Provided Plan Types
Self Reported
Provider Report DB DC Both DK Total
DB 777 213 380 22 1392
DC 160 327 111 10 608
Both 409 163 315 20 907
Total 1346 703 806 52 2907
3B:Percentages with Self Reported vs. Firm Provided Plan Types
Self Reported
Provider Report DB DC Both DK Total
DB 27.0% 7.0% 13.0% 1.0% 48.0%
DC 6.0% 11.0% 4.0% 0.0% 21.0%
Both 14.0% 6.0% 11.0% 1.0% 31.0%
Total 46.0% 24.0% 28.0% 2.0% 100.0%
3C: Percentages with Self Reported Plan Type Conditional on Firm Report of Plan Type
(Percent of Row Total)
Self Reported
Provider Report DB DC Both DK Total
DB 55.8% 15.3% 27.3% 1.6% 100.0%
DC 26.3% 53.8% 18.3% 1.6% 100.0%
Both 45.1% 18.0% 34.7% 2.2% 100.0%
Total 46.3% 24.2% 27.7% 1.8% 100.0%
3D: Percentage with Firm Reported Plan Type Conditional on Respondent Report of Plan Type
(Percent of Column Total)
Self Reported
Provider Report DB DC Both DK Total
DB 57.7% 3.0% 47.1% 42.3% 47.9%
DC 11.9% 46.5% 13.8% 19.2% 20.9%
Both 30.4% 23.2% 39.1% 38.5% 31.2%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%46
Table 4: Self Reported vs. Firm Provider Reported Dates of Early Retirement for Plans Reported as Defined Benefit by Both the
Respondent and the Firm 
Self Reported
Provider <50 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 >65 DK Total
Reported
<50 19 5 5 3 5 2 54 1 2 2 7 23 1 2 7 138
50 7 24 6 3 4 1 65 3 4 4 5 8 1 14 1 1 17 168
51 3 6 2 1 5 1 2 2 2 3 5 1 3 36
52 1 3 2 11 1 1 7 1 4 31
53 2 1 8 1 1 9 2 3 1 1 1 2 32
54 3 1 2 8 1 1 2 5 4 1 3 31
55 15 11 4 6 9 12 314 22 22 22 28 37 2 160 5 4 46 7 43 769
56 3 2 2 20 2 2 1 1 6 2 9 1 5 2 4 62
57 3 1 1 11 4 3 3 6 2 9 2 1 7 53
58 1 1 6 1 8 6 3 3 1 9 3 4 46
59 1 2 1 11 3 4 3 9 1 6 5 6 52
60 9 5 1 3 1 6 26 8 4 7 8 40 5 68 2 17 1 25 236
61 1 4 1 1 7 4 7 1 1 2 29
62 2 1 1 13 1 3 3 3 7 3 28 2 2 11 1 7 88
63 1 1 6 2 2 1 13
64 1 1 1 1 8 2 1 3 18
65 2 21 4 1 8 8 44
>65 1 2 1 3 1 5 1 3 17
DK 1 2 1 8 2 1 3 18
Total66 59 20 31 25 26 562 48 52 58 61 152 22 390 20 11 111 15 152188147
Table 5: Self Reported vs. Firm Provider Reported Dates of Early Retirement for Plans Reported as Defined Benefit by Both the
Respondent and the Firm, Including Only Observations Of Wave 1 Respondents Who Plan to Retire By 1995
Self Reported
Provider <5 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 >6 DK Tot
Reported
<50 6 2 1 2 1 17 1 3 5 2 40
50 1 5 2 1 17 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 36
51 1 3 2 1 2 1 10
52 1 1 4 1 1 2 10
53 1 1 3 1 1 1 8
54 4 1 3 8
55 4 3 1 2 3 1 57 2 5 1 5 10 1 27 2 1 4 1 5 135
56 1 1 9 2 1 1 15
57 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 10
58 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 10
59 1 1 1 1 4
60 1 1 2 3 8 1 2 10 10 1 3 3 45
61 2 3 1 1 7
62 2 1 1 1 6 1 1 13
63 1 2 1 4
64 1 1 1 3
65 1 4 1 1 3 10
>65 1 1 2
DK 1 1
Total 16 16 4 6 7 6 132 5 13 3 11 41 4 62 6 3 9 3 24 37148
Table 6: Self Reported vs. Firm Provider Reported Dates of Normal Retirement  for Plans Reported as Defined Benefit by Both the
Respondent and the Firm 
Self Reported
Provider <50 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 >65 DK Total
Reported
<50 1 1 2 2 6 1 3 5 1 22
50 7 6 1 1 5 7 2 7 5 41
51 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 8
52 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 13
53 4 1 1 5 1 2 1 1 16
54 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 13
55 4 2 1 1 2 2 81 2 3 1 3 5 15 2 13 2 7 146
56 1 9 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 26
57 13 4 7 2 2 2 1 4 1 1 37
58 1 1 1 8 2 5 4 1 1 5 1 6 2 38
59 1 1 11 3 4 3 4 3 1 1 4 3 39
60 1 2 1 1 4 63 6 9 5 15 69 6 67 7 2 50 9 26 343
61 4 1 1 13 2 5 5 2 2 35
62 5 2 1 3 2 19 4 5 7 8 13 10 95 10 4 68 16 21 293
63 2 1 1 1 5 1 1 3 1 3 19
64 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 17
65 5 2 2 4 3 3 74 3 12 15 21 41 7 188 6 7 287 17 42 739
>65 1 3 1 4 6 2 17
DK 1 1 1 6 1 6 1 2 19
Total20 19 8 17 14 12 310 27 49 44 56 166 25 415 31 21 466 58 123188149
Table 7: Self-Reported vs. Provider Annual Early Retirement Reduction Rates, for Plans Reported as Defined Benefit by Both the
Respondent and the Firm 
Self Reported
Provider 0-1% 1-2% 2-3% 3-4% 4-5% 5-6% 6-7% 7-8% 8-10% >10 % NA Total
Reported
0-1% 1 9 4 6 1 4 4 5 102 136
1-2% 5 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 1 6 83 117
2-3% 1 3 2 5 8 2 6 4 97 128
3-4% 2 2 4 7 10 3 2 1 3 123 157
4-5% 3 7 4 5 3 5 4 4 2 9 191 237
5-6% 4 1 3 1 1 6 4 2 7 102 131
6-7% 1 1 1 47 50
7-8% 1 1 1 27 30
8-10% 2 2 2 1 1 2 31 41
>10% 1 1 2 3 3 62 72
DK/NA 7 28 14 20 2 16 7 9 6 26 647 782
Total 25 55 34 51 9 58 32 27 13 65 1512 188150
Table 8: Self-Reported vs. Provider Voluntary Contributions
Self Reported
Provider Report No Yes Total
No 121 57 178
Yes 303 392 695
Total 424 449 87351
Table 9: Distribution of Pension Values for Current Jobs Held at Time of the Survey ($1992)










95 385,497 523,704 200,000 347,265
90 311,775 387,276 128,322 223,951
75 211,733 227,373 45,000 100,030
50 116,327 112,380 15,000 29,067
25 48,084 49,767 4,500 6,093
10 16,805 24,223 1,200 750
5 9,231 11,252 400 0




Columns 1 and 2 are present values as of the date of expected retirement, discounted to 1992. 
They are not prorated to allow comparisons between individual and firm reports of DB plan
values, as the individual reports were as of the date of expected retirement.  The DB and DC
amounts in this table are not comparable since the DC amounts are account balances as of 1992,
and do not include future contributions.52








500- 1M >1M DK Total
0 6 3 3 5 4 6 5 1 157 190
0K-5K 2 1 1 1 7 12
5K-10K 3 2 2 1 1 3 2 6 20
10K-20K 5 13 7 6 3 3 1 42 80
20K-50K 3 19 31 65 38 25 9 1 133 324
50K-100K 2 3 8 51 91 55 14 141 365
100K-200K1 1 5 3 21 63 131 62 1 113 401
200K-500K 6 7 16 84 147 2 63 325
500K-1M 1 3 5 43 7 2 6 67
> 1M 2 2 4
DK 1 5 2 2 1 82 93
Total 1 22 47 61 165 218 314 287 14 2 750 188153








500- 1M >1M DK Total
0 2 28 8 9 6 4 2 38 97
0K-5K 1 58 14 7 5 1 1 25 112
5K-10K 22 13 5 2 1 1 12 56
10K-20K 1 18 22 23 13 3 2 26 108
20K-50K 1 18 19 21 37 10 2 2 1 31 142
50K-100K 9 12 13 27 18 15 3 35 132
100K-200K 5 5 11 27 16 12 6 2 1 21 106
200K-500K 1 1 3 14 15 14 14 2 3 12 79
500K-1M 1 4 1 6
> 1M 1 1 1 1 4
DK 4 1 4 11 3 51 74
Total 5 163 96 96 142 73 48 31 6 4 252 91654
Table 12: Self Reported Vs. Provider Reported Amounts Accumulated in Defined Contribution Accumulated Amounts for Plans

















0 1 10 3 1 1 1 11 28
0K-5K 15 4 2 2 1 1 9 34
5K-10K 4 4 3 1 1 2 15
10K-20K 4 2 6 5 2 2 6 27
20K-50K 3 4 8 2 2 2 1 8 30
50K-100K 2 2 2 3 6 2 10 27
100K-200K 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 4 16
200K-500K 1 1 1 2 5
500K-1M
> 1M
DK 1 1 4 6
Total 1 40 18 15 24 12 12 7 2 3 54 18855
Table 13: Reported Accumulations and Calculated Values of Defined Contribution Pensions
Calculated Value of Pension
0-5K 5-10K 10-20K20-50K 50-100K 100-200K 200-500K 500K-1M>1M
Pensions Without Voluntary Contributions
Median Accumulation
   Reported By Respondents
1,900 7,000 14,00024,85092,00040,000 400,000 - -
Median Value Calculated from
   Pension Documents
1,207 7,668 15,92427,97267,050 142,295 287,970 - -
Number of Observations 42 13 21 22 17 12 5
Pensions With Voluntary Contributions
Median Accumulation
   Reported By Respondents
3,375 4,200 7,000 15,00030,00037,50094,500 206,000 201,750
Median Value Calculated from
   Pension Documents
1,146 6,945 15,09030,38969,141 131,885 292,690 550,933 1,151,112
Number of Observations 104 31 61 89 80 73 62 5 456
Table 14: Median Regression for the Over Prediction of Pension Values Calculated from Plan
Documents
Defined Contribution Plans with Voluntary Contributions
Dependent variable is the ratio of the value of the pension calculated from plan documents to
the accumulation reported by the respondent.
Explanatory Variables: Coefficient t-statistic
   Constant 3.1822 3.56
   ln (pension value calculated from plan documents) -0.4200 2.39
   [ln (pension value calculated from plan documents)]
2 0.0152 1.77
Number of Observations 46757

















0 5 67 30 35 31 14 11 4 2 0 295      494
0K-5K 1 77 20 7 11 1 2 1 0 0 88 208
5K-10K 0 26 24 22 14 2 5 0 0 0 81   174
10K-20K 1 20 26 43 49 18 4 2 0 0 98      261
20K-50K 0 11 12 38 92 61 31 14 2 0 176     437
50K-100K 0 3 4 9 39 90 72 21 2 0 163    403
100K-200K 0 1 5 2 15 59 121 56 4 2 111    376
200K-500K 0 1 0 4 4 15 67 128 9 1 53      282
500K-1M 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 26 6 2 6       45
> 1M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0        5
DK 1 4 2 2 10 4 3 1 0 0 143     170
Total 8 210 123 162 267 264 319 255 27 6 1214 285558
Table 16: Regression of Provider Total Pensions on Self-Reported Pensions Plus Other Variables
Independent Variable Dependent Variable =1
if Provider Pension = 0
Dependent Variable =1
if Provider Pension = 0












Dependent Variable =1 if
Provider Pension = 0;
Includes Observations
With Zero Self Reported
Values




and Zero Self Reported
Values
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient z Coefficient t
constant 1.8518 -3.634 1.3436 0.843 2.8820 17.516 0.3946 .627 1.1667 0.609 -1.7049 -1.791
respondent  reports zero         
  pension value
-1.5584 -12.302 -0.1049 -0.199 6.2749 14.304 2.1122 5.941
ln  of value respondent           
  reports
-0.3005 7.610 -0.1265 -3.044 0.7347 48.866 0.2393 11.914
current age -0.0001 -0.012 0.0641 13.126 -0.0103 -0.847 0.0925 14.631
age at hire 0.0051 0.839 -0.0588 -24.723 0.0268 4.348 -0.0780 -23.671
age expects benefits to begin 0.0277 0.020 -0.0304 -4.114 -0.0482 -2.486 -0.0124 -1.514
age benefit expected missing -0.6440 -0.535 -1.6050 -3.096
respondent has only dc plan 2.1980 1.712 -2.7741 -6.090 0.0819 0.062 -3.0848 -5.504
respondent  has db and dc, or 
   combination plan
-0.2497 -1.107 -0.2605 -3.290 -0.4248 -1.829 -0.2903 -2.542
early retirement age, db         
 plan, =0 for DC plan
0.1299 0.666 0.0036 0.599 0.0153 0.836 -0.0272 -3.468
respondent reports can           
 collect benefits at any age
0.0180 0.036 -1.7266 1.921
early retirement age missing 0.6858 0.570 0.1531 0.422 1.0917 0.989 -1.7534 -3.694
normal retirement age, db      
  plan, =0 for DC plan
-0.0191 -1.134 -0.0037 -0.695 0.0087 0.486 0.0016 0.205
normal  retirement age           
  missing
-1.5753 -1.395 -0.1793 -0.529 0.5958 0.529 0.1609 0.324
annual  reduction factor, db   
  plans, =0 for dc plans
-3.5662 -0.954 -0.0411 -0.080 1.4351 0.901 -0.0061 -0.008
reduction factor missing -0.2735 -0.966 -0.0267 -0.411 0.0914 0.353 0.1601 1.407
contribution  rate for              
  401k/403b/sra plans, 0       
  otherwise
-1.0265 -0.704 1.2385 1.981 -3.8001 -2.039 1.7229 1.964
contribution rate missing -0.1614 -1.008 0.1486 1.941 0.2449 1.208 0.3791 3.326
female 0.0170 0.142 0.1380 3.035 -0.3595 -2.658 0.2552 3.703
ln earnings -0.2999 -2.819 0.7975 16.156 -0.1231 -0.923 1.2024 16.621
zeroearn -2.8484 -2.144 8.2435 13.437 (dropped)
fulltime -0.1308 -0.834 -0.1273 -1.924 -0.2316 -1.319 -0.3411 -3.531
union 0.2526 2.234 0.0259 0.632 0.1450 1.268 0.1835 3.112
manufacturing 0.2150 1.326 -0.0450 -0.685 -0.2963 -1.392 -0.2656 -3.018Independent Variable Dependent Variable =1
if Provider Pension = 0
Dependent Variable =1
if Provider Pension = 0












Dependent Variable =1 if
Provider Pension = 0;
Includes Observations
With Zero Self Reported
Values




and Zero Self Reported
Values
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Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient z Coefficient t
public employment 0.3303 2.019 0.4032 6.931 -0.0031 -0.018 0.4075 4.130
manager or professional 0.3655 2.359 0.2653 4.632 0.4016 2.168 0.0191 0.216
white collar -0.0198 -0.135 0.2453 4.394 0.5067 3.043 0.0576 0.707
firm size >100 0.0586 0.386 -0.0494 -0.738 -0.4179 -2.472 0.0589 0.529
firm size missing 0.7342 1.794 0.0237 0.114 -0.1610 -0.348 -0.1085 -0.296
health is good -0.0766 -0.701 0.0066 0.156 0.1376 1.129 0.0144 0.227
health is poor 0.0467 0.255 -0.0348 -0.474 0.0621 0.328 -0.0761 -0.788
plans  over next few months   
 or years
0.1812 1.545 -0.0019 -.04 0.0711 0.541 -0.0063 -0.090
planning  horizon is 5 to 10   
  years, or more than 10         
years
0.0591 0.348 0.0687 1.013 -0.0121 -0.057 -0.0145 -0.144
planning horizon  not             
  available
0.2955 0.915 0.2286 1.621 -0.3081 -1.074 -0.0578 -0.377
number of words recalled in  
  second test
-0.0163 -0.873 0.0167 2.427 -0.0119 -0.559 -0.0008 -0.072
missing recall measure  -0.0247 -0.079 -0.0393 -0.289 0.1249 0.393 0.1580 0952
Number of Observations 1614 1611 1415 1415 1067 776
Adjusted or Pseudo R2 0.1525 0.2686 0.6297 .7970 .4133 .725660
Table 17: Pensions Over Time In The Same Job
1994 Observation
No Pension Pension
1992 Observation No Pension 1075 271
Pension 73 313861
Table 18: SSA Vs. Respondent Reported Earnings (AIME, Expressed on an Annual Basis, in 1992 Dollars)
All Respondents Male Respondents Female Respondents
Respondent SSA Difference Respondent SSA Difference Respondent SSA Difference
Mean 13378 12548 -1190 19909 19230 -680 8545 6926 -1620
Percentile
95 31958 30820 7720 33341 32587 10221 24526 20228 4702
90 29422 28252 4785 32022 31034 6915 20330 16211 2950
75 22922 20773 1481 28356 27261 2609 13280 10425 778
50 12110 10070 -453 21866 20551 -245 6554 5067 -611
25 3969 3513 -3660 12366 11570 -3778 1850 1754 -3572
10 462 903 -8225 3853 4772 -8815 0 394 -7730




Correlation 0.82 0.72 0.76
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.  Average
Indexed Monthly Earnings, expressed on an annual basis, equals AIME*12.62




0 - 44 - 88 - 12 12 - 16 16 - 20 20 - 24 24 - 28 28 - 32 32 - 36 36 - 40 40+ Total
0 - 4 1803 358 105 34 27 21 18 14 2 0 0 2382
4 - 8 395 519 182 70 32 16 10 4 2 0 0 1230
8 - 12 173 338 358 136 49 25 10 6 2 0 0 1097
12 - 16 72 148 264 228 144 63 22 9 0 0 0 950
16 - 20 47 62 145 217 178 125 75 18 3 1 0 871
20 - 24 31 40 63 117 195 184 136 41 10 0 0 817
24 - 28 32 13 46 50 94 206 287 125 16 0 0 869
28 - 32 13 20 14 23 39 76 188 334 83 0 0 790
32 - 36 6 6 16 14 24 25 44 141 172 0 0 448
36 - 40 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 3 4 3 0 15
40+ 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
Total 2572 1505 1193 889 783 742 794 695 295 4 0 9472
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.  Average
Indexed Yearly Earnings equals Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, expressed on an annual basis, which equals AIME*12.63
Table 20: SSA Vs. Respondent Reported Primary Insurance Amount, Expressed on an Annual Basis (in 1992 Dollars)
All Respondents Male Respondents Female Respondents
Respondent SSA Difference Respondent SSA Difference Respondent SSA Difference
Mean  6293 5948 -345 8399 8282 -117 4521 3984 -537
Percentile
95 12003 11806 3153 12189 12087 3829 10078 8780 2659
90 11507 11156 1944 12014 11844 2404 8823 7607 1561
75 9574 8940 623 11201 10867 887 6725 5861 464
50 6371 5764 -171 9252 8873 -59 4727 4209 -295
25 3323 2959 -1316 6431 6203 -1124 1554 1479 -1495
10 386 758 -2901 3201 4012 -2716 0 332 -3053




Correlation 0.81 0.71 0.76
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.    The
Primary Insurance Amount is multiplied by 12.64
Table 21: Distribution of Primary Insurance Amount Based on Respondent And SSA Reports (Thousands of 1992 Dollars, Expressed




0 - 1 1 - 2 2 - 3 3 - 4 4 - 5 5 - 6 6 - 7 7 - 8 8 - 9 9 - 10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13+ Total
0 - 1 731 240 99 64 67 45 16 14 9 10 9 10 1 0 1315
1 - 2 120 128 84 43 54 25 12 5 5 3 1 1 0 0 481
2 - 3 60 88 93 62 62 33 12 5 5 2 5 4 0 0 431
3 - 4 42 49 65 71 87 36 8 6 2 4 2 1 0 0 373
4 - 5 54 70 112 121 250 133 50 31 19 9 6 3 1 0 859
5 - 6 46 45 52 70 221 291 125 49 29 11 6 4 1 0 950
6 - 7 17 24 30 32 137 209 195 103 63 26 14 6 2 0 858
7 - 8 16 10 20 19 46 114 180 145 104 54 29 11 2 1 751
8 - 9 12 7 11 8 31 72 112 137 131 95 63 18 6 0 703
9 - 10 11 5 10 9 21 41 53 101 150 135 109 50 8 0 703
10-11 14 3 4 9 3 27 33 48 87 149 220 120 17 0 734
11-12 4 6 1 6 16 14 17 26 50 88 159 375 76 0 838
12-13 3 1 3 0 7 9 15 10 20 23 44 150 176 0 461
13+ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 4 1 15
Total 1130 676 584 515 1002 1049 828 682 675 610 670 755 294 2 9472
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.  The
Primary Insurance Amount is multiplied by 12 to express it on an annual basis.65
Table 22: SSA Vs. Respondent Present Value of Social Security Benefits (1992 Dollars)
All Respondents Male Respondents Female Respondents
Respondent SSA Difference Respondent SSA Difference Respondent SSA Difference
Mean 55745 56222 -3123 71880 71305 -844 42170 37130 -5041
Percentile
95 113163 109625 28315 119057 117684 32868 97495 85268 24281
90 100862 97570 17501 110794 108923 20649 83782 72367 14584
75 81624 76572 5558 94583 92596 7374 62816 54192 4128
50 55678 50471 -1423 75379 72692 -400 42207 36548 -2585
25 29682 26637 -11635 51592 49702 -9327 13963 13511 -13789
10 3331 6807 -26340 26403 30988 -23195 0 2977 -27956




Correlation 0.81 0.75 0.77
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.66
Table 23: Distribution of Present Values of OWN Social Security Benefits Based on Respondent And SSA Reports 

































0 - 10788 249 104 73 69 30 17 13 9 6 6 6 1 1 1372
10 - 20 137 151 92 71 40 20 8 5 2 3 0 1 0 0 530
2 0- 30 78 101 126 91 52 20 6 4 3 2 2 2 1 0 488
3 0- 40 54 91 112 225 130 53 18 13 8 3 2 2 0 1 712
4 0- 50 57 63 95 213 343 132 70 20 21 5 0 3 1 0 1023
50 - 60 32 44 46 98 285 286 157 58 23 12 2 4 1 0 1048
6 0- 70 24 19 18 52 131 210 227 138 50 20 3 5 0 1 898
70 - 80 20 12 22 30 73 118 195 231 125 40 16 1 3 2 888
80 - 90 10 1 9 13 30 60 102 204 206 100 29 9 3 1 777
90 - 100 7 8 7 13 25 35 53 927 157 260 63 17 2 4 743
100-1103 5 1 6 9 7 12 23 50 103 155 38 4 1 417
110-1209 0 1 4 5 7 8 15 19 20 67 127 23 8 313
120-1301 2 1 0 1 4 1 6 4 7 13 29 52 7 128
130+ 3 0 1 1 0 4 3 4 1 4 10 11 19 74 135
Total 1223 746 635 890 1193 986 877 826 678 585 368 255 110 100 9472
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.67
Table 24: Regressions of Average Indexed Yearly Earnings Calculated from Social Security Records on Average Indexed Yearly Earnings Calculated from Earnings Imputed From Survey
Independent Variables All Observations With Matched Social Security Earnings Records Observations for Males With
Matched Social Security Earnings
Records
Observations for Females With
Matched Social Security Earnings
Records
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
constant 1862.567 -19.016 4981.976 13.855 3402.957 3.648 1398.607 4.305
AIME  calculated from earnings imputed from
    survey
0.7777729137.799 0.508322 45.367 0.496085 26.184 0.464773 32.268
AIME imputed from expected benefit amount 0.098246 12.103 0.098774 7.976 0.081594 7.976
AIME from expected benefit missing 575.1495 2.844 -140.401 -0.296 551.66 2.785
AIME from earnings imputed  from survey      
 interacted with missing value indicator
-0.01288 -1.123 0.022119 1.061 -0.02161 -1.405
female -5007.04 -37.722 (dropped) (dropped)
married 133.7257 0.983 1533.768 5.438 -702.969 -5.434
resondent working at time of survey 460.8062 1.822 919.6561 1.078 543.8686 2.509
earnings in current job 0.037378 7.207 0.021982 2.789 0.050138 7.390
indicator respondent had section G job -618.953 -2.284 -1119.76 -1.27 -305.116 -1.291
earnings from section G job 0.04359 6.015 0.047313 4.047 0.065221 6.634
self employed -1206.42 -7.305 -1151.8 -4.161 -1337.15 -7.311
worked for federal government in past -1304.03 -6.934 -2234.92 -7.254 -148.641 -.698
worked for a state government in past -262.562 -2.006 -312.554 -1.388 -141.215 -1.040
reported a nonSocial Security job in past -991.027 -6.688 -1186.12 -4.735 -1025.29 -6.330
current or last five year job was fulltime -399.307 -2.710 -744.787 -2.319 -102.916 -0.742
respondent had a pension in any job 2441.358 17.927 3051.091 12.179 2068.543 14.877
union in main job 150.4643 1.088 303.0848 1.331 -37.2376 -0.237
management/professional in main job 1099.166 8.029 1308.136 5.657 990.0998 6.561
manufacturing in main job 1640.825 11.643 1860.837 8.255 1183.972 7.164
indicator survey available for 1996 35.57308 0.215 698.9399 2.506 -801.524 -4.402
reported health excellent or very good 105.3806 0.849 152.5965 0.692 142.7883 1.110
reported health fair or poor -595.914 -3.873 -725.832 -2.643 -456.815 -2.866
health variable not available (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
plans over next few months or next year -332.302 -2.74 -577.749 -2.582 -96.458 -0.792
plans over 5 to 10 years, or > 10 years -155.735 -0.813 135.3838 0.399 -374.559 -1.888
planning horizon not available -448.932 -1.5 -404.633 -0.772 -605.107 -1.887
words recalled in second test 33.78321 1.735 47.17687 1.254 39.51627 2.082
recall variable missing 415.102 1.282 509.4233 0.937 433.8685 1.162
Number of Observations 9472 9472 4328 5144
Adjusted  R2 0.6672 0.7535 0.5992 0.6550
This table includes the Social Security records obtained with permissions granted by respondents to HRS waves 1, 2 and 3.  Average Indexed Yearly Earnings equals AIME times 12.68
Ratios of Median Reported Accumulations to Median Calculated 
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Men 71.1 [ 5867] 55.5 [ 4972]
Women 72.2 [ 6785] 54.6 [ 3710]
Combined 71.6 [12652] 55.2 [ 8682]
Age
<= 50 73.7 [ 1595] 60.7 [  971]
51-61 71.3 [ 9742] 54.7 [ 6951]
>= 62 72.4 [ 1315] 57.7 [ 1008]
Marital Status
Married 72.4 [ 9896] 56 [ 6997]
Single 70.1 [ 2756] 53.4 [ 1685]
Parents
Yes 72.2 [11743] 55 [ 8003]
No 68.3 [  754] 57.9 [  547]
Race
White 71.8 [ 9415] 54.7 [ 6870]
Black 71.7 [ 2064] 62.7 [ 1360]
Hispanic 69 [ 1173] 48.4 [  452]
Education
< HS 73.4 [ 3696] 47.6 [ 1675]
HS Grad 74.1 [ 4424] 54.5 [ 3064]
Some Coll 69.4 [ 2320] 55.7 [ 1812]
Coll Grad 68.6 [ 1040] 56.3 [  951]
Grad Sch 66.7 [ 1172] 62.4 [ 1180]
Residence Status
Homeowner 71.1 [10205] 56.2 [ 7517]
Renter 73.3 [ 2447] 49.6 [ 1165]
Assets
< 10K 75.8 [ 1949] 49.9 [  781]
10-25K 77.5 [  812] 51.8 [  447]
25-100K 74.6 [ 3565] 56 [ 2571]
100-250K 70.8 [ 3304] 57.7 [ 2744]
250K-1M 65.2 [ 2393] 57.5 [ 1809]
1M+ 63.9 [  534] 33.1 [  280]
Retirement Horizon
< 2 Yrs 73.5 [ 2939] 62.7 [ 2146]
2 to 4 years 74.2 [ 1040] 61.6 [  972]












10+ 74.1 [ 2396] 50.1 [ 2077]
Never Retire 71.1 [ 1069] 45.5 [  549]
Self Employed
Yes 67.9 [ 1564] 0 [  184]
No 72.8 [10022] 56.8 [ 8498]
Combined 72.1 [11586] 55.2 [ 8682]
Tenure with Firm
< 2 Years 72.6 [  578] 51.7 [  269]
2 to 4 Years71.2 [  775] 52.5 [  657]
5 to 9 Years73.8 [ 2286] 41.7 [ 1825]
10+ Years 71.7 [ 7944] 60 [ 5894]
Size of Firm
< 5 71 [  805] 17 [   90]
5-14 72.4 [  609] 25.3 [  163]
15-24 65.4 [  242] 45.4 [   97]
25-99 74.6 [  611] 40.3 [  432]
100-499 75.2 [  750] 56.5 [  710]
500+ 72.7 [ 1634] 73.9 [ 1784]
Industry
Manufacturing 74.7 [ 2520] 49.5 [ 2318]
Other 71.5 [ 8971] 57.5 [ 6283]
Occupation
Mgmt/Prof 69.2 [ 3318] 57 [ 3006]
White Collar 70.7 [ 2871] 52.6 [ 2113]
Blue Collar 75.4 [ 5356] 55.2 [ 3528]
Union Status
Union 72.1 [ 2122] 70.1 [ 2253]
Nonunion 71.9 [ 5448] 62.1 [ 3576]
Annual Earnings
< 15K 74.4 [ 4630] 44.2 [ 2427]
15-30K 71.9 [ 3519] 54.6 [ 3169]
30-50K 70.3 [ 2089] 63.5 [ 2069]
50-100K 72.4 [  879] 67.2 [  810]
100K+ 63.5 [  191] 30.4 [  128]
Pension
Yes 72.6 [ 5056]
No 71.8 [ 6530]
The observations in this table use the HRS survey weights.  Percentages in column 2 are for permissions as
reported in V136, wave 1. Job characteristics in column 1 are for the longest job.  Calculations for columns 3 and 4
include only jobs offering pensions.  Numbers in brackets are the observations over which the percentage is taken. 
Percentages are weighted averages.73








Defined Benefit 59.1 [ 4528]
Defined Contrib 40.8 [ 2446]
Combination 69.2 [ 1368]
DB Annual Benefit
< 2K 41.8 [  664]
2-5K 49.8 [  663]
5-10K 61.4 [  794]
10-25K 71.6 [ 1475]
25K+ 76.9 [  642]
DC Account Value
< 10K 46.9 [ 1258]
10-25K 58.9 [  627]
25-100K 54.5 [  641]
100-250K 68.1 [  184]
250K+ 52.0 [   86]
The observations in this table use the HRS survey weights.  